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Abstract: Injuries, accidents or even fatalities while working in pilot plant are reported worldwide. The 
implementation of process hazards analysis (PHA) in pilot plant is expected to further reduce the risks of accidents. 
Hazard and operability (HAZOP) analysis is one of the most widely used methods for PHA. Generally, the 
outcome of HAZOP analysis could results in identifying large number of hazards thus poses a challenge for 
assessors to take actions in dealing with all the hazards. The common practice in prioritizing the critical hazards is 
based on assessors’ experience through deductive judgment using rating scale, taking into consideration safety and 
the associated costs. However the novel operations and process used, unproven or changing technology, and lack of 
safety information due to developmental stages have led to poor hazards prioritization and difficulty in selecting 
actions. This paper presents an application of analytical hierarchy process (AHP) in prioritizing HAZOP analysis 
for pilot plant. Through this approach, the significant hazards identified using HAZOP will be quantitatively 
weighted and ranked based on their priority along with the appropriate counter measures to be taken. Application of 
this approach at the high pressure CO2-hydrocarbon absorption system pilot plants as case study showed that the 
proposed methodology is capable of identifying and ranking the significant hazards in the process following 
HAZOP analysis. This is particularly useful as a leading indicator to process designers/engineers/researcher in 
prioritizing their efforts and resources on more significant hazards, hence prevent accidents of the pilot plant. 
Keywords: Analytic hierarchy process (AHP); Hazard and operability (HAZOP); Pilot plant; Hazards analysis. 
Introduction 
Pilot plant occupies a grey area somewhere in the 
middle of the spectrum from basic research to real 
process plant production. Some of the items are 
physically part of research unit operations, whereas 
others are part of the manufacturing operation. 
Generally, the volumes of hazardous chemicals in pilot 
plant are lower than commercial plant and considered 
to be safe without requiring extra precautions. 
However the novel operations and processes used, high 
operation density of equipment, unproven or changing 
technology, lack of safety related information due to 
developmental stages, waste generated by the 
operation, use of sophisticated instruments gives a 
significant hazard impact that can cause injuries, 
fatalities and property damage.
1-3
 As an example, in 
real process plant, the plant layout and equipment safe 
siting distance normally follows standards to avoid the 
damaging effect in the case of the accident. However, 
pilot plant does not have such a standard to follow and 
normally the users intend to design a compact pilot 
plant system. The users normally assume it is safe to 
operate in a compact design due to small quantity of 
hazardous chemicals to be handled. Due to high 
density of operating equipment, the risk of the accident 
may be significant. The various heating devices 
installed like furnaces, heaters and electrical 
equipment in the designated area could increase the 
risk. In the event of the accident such as fire or 
explosion, it may involve numbers of equipment that 
varies from reactors to compressors. These equipment 
have different hazard potential that installed close with 
each other will make the accident worst. 
 
Hazard recognition in laboratories and pilot plant is 
generally managed under, either Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) Laboratory 
standard 29 CFR 1910.1450 or Hazard 
Communication standard 29 CFR 1910.1200. Both of 
these standards emphasize communication of hazard 
information via a Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) 
and a product label. Many institutions may have their 
internal guidelines for controlling hazards or risks in 
chemical laboratories such as Chemical Hygiene 
Plan.
4
However, such standards and internal guidelines 
may have limitation to manage process hazards in the 
pilot plant. According to Mason
5
 pilot plant is to the 
development of a potential new production process 
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which is specifically exempted from the OSHA 
Laboratory standard because it fails to meet the 
definition of ‘laboratory’.  In addition, West
6
 in his 
studies classified that pilot plant and full-scale 
production has similarity in terms of typical stages in 
assessment of chemicals. 
 
Process hazard analysis (PHA) is imperative for 
inherent safer design and operation of chemical 
processes. The implementation of PHA in pilot plant is 
expected to further reduce the risks associated with the 
operations in this location.
7,8
 Many methods and tools 
are available for performing PHA either quantitatively 
and/or qualitatively. Some of the well-known methods 
are hazard and operability study (HAZOP), fault tree 
analysis (FTA), failure mode effect analysis (FMEA) 
and What-if analysis.All ofthe above methods require 
their rigorous, thorough, and systematic application by 
a multidisciplinary team of experts. Success rests upon 
first identifying and subsequently analyzing possible 
scenarios that can cause accidents with different 
degrees of severity. Without a structured identification 
system, hazards can be overlooked, so entailing 
incomplete risk-evaluations and potential loss.
9
 
 
Among these, HAZOP is the most widely used and 
considered as formal procedure to identify hazards in 
chemical plant. The nature of conducting HAZOP 
however, is very time-consuming, demanding and 
exhaustive.
10
 Due to its ‘let the mind go free’ 
approach, HAZOP analysis could result in a vast 
number of hazards being identified. In addition, the 
HAZOP analysis output however provides limited data 
only (plus qualitative), thus many of those hazards 
identified may have low probability or 
consequences.
11
The common practice in prioritizing 
the critical hazards is based on assessors’ experience 
through deductive judgment using rating scale, taking 
into consideration safety and the associated costs. 
However, due to the novel operations and process 
which being used, unproven or changing technology, 
and lack of safety related information at developmental 
stages has form a complex decision-making process 
with interrelated components.
2,3
 This consequently led 
to poor hazards prioritization and difficulty in selecting 
actions that address the most substantial hazards 
especially when safety and cost criteria are involved. 
Presumably, while interacting with such complex 
scenarios, the better the decision makers understand 
this complexity, the better the decision will be. 
As an alternative to the addressed issues, analytic 
hierarchy process (AHP) which is a widely used 
decision making tool, can be incorporated into the 
typical HAZOP procedure to provide a mean for 
prioritization of the risks and consequences. This is to 
ensure that the most significant hazard(s) is being 
addressed first properly within the available resources. 
AHP is a multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) 
methodology based on hierarchical structure and it is 
the most suitable approach for MCDM problems.
12
 Its 
hierarchical and systematic method makes it a popular 
technique to solve MCDM problems and have been 
implemented in few safety related area including 
selection of contractors for safer turnaround 
maintenance
13
, selection of safety devices
14
,multi-
experts opinion of natural gas pipelines failure.
15
 This 
paper presents the application of AHP in prioritizing 
HAZOP analysis outcomes in pilot plant. Application 
of this approach at the high pressure CO2-hydrocarbon 
absorption system pilot plants as case study is 
examined and discussed. 
Materials and Methods 
HAZOP-AHP 
HAZOP-AHP is developed as a methodology that 
incorporates a multi-criteria decision making approach 
to prioritize the hazards that may contribute to the 
undesirable events identified from the HAZOP 
analysis. The general steps to the methodology are 
performing HAZOP analysis, constructing problem 
decomposition hierarchy, performing pairwise 
comparison matrix, calculating weights ranking and 
undergo consistency test, developing overall priority 
ranking and analyzing the HAZOP-AHP results.
16
 
 
In this study, the HAZOP methodology is adopted 
from Crowl and Louvar.
11
The analysis was performed 
by the HAZOP members that comprises of lecturers, 
research scientist, technologies and post graduate 
students who directly involves with the operation and 
experienced with HAZOP study. After the HAZOP 
analysis table was constructed, Super Decision 
software (SDS) was used for weight calculation. SDS 
is one of the AHP tool due to powerful and flexible in 
making multi-criteria decision.
17
 SDS consists of four 
steps: (1) building a hierarchy of the objective or goal, 
(2) entering the alternatives, (3) comparing the 
elements and finally, (4) synthesizing the result. 
 
Under step 1 and 2, the overall goal, criteria, sub-
criteria, and alternatives form a linear hierarchy 
involving all of them in several levels. Each level is 
tagged with a unique identification numbering system 
that facilitates the activity tracking. In step 3, pairwise 
comparison was performed at every level whereby two 
components are compared with respect to the upper 
level control criteria using scale of relative importance. 
The scaling factor is based on established fundamental 
scale of absolute numbers by Satty
18
 as show in 
Table1. It is important to note that assigning scale to 
the elements is subjective thus the assessor’s 
knowledge, experience and judgment is crucial. In this 
case, setting the scaling factor during the construction 
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of pairwise comparison matrix table has been done by 
the HAZOP team members. The final step in this 
methodology is analysis of the outcome from the 
HAZOP-AHP assessment. Since the analysis includes 
quantitative valuation, the selection of outcomes can 
be easily rank and prioritized. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using piping and instrumentation diagram 
(P&ID) as a foundation for data management 
 
In this work, a node system technique based on P&ID 
is used to manage and track documents of the process 
hazards. Figure 1 shows the framework of how P&ID 
is utilized in managing HAZOP-AHP information 
within a pilot plant. The P&ID is divided into several 
nodes and generally as similar as HAZOP study node. 
The HAZOP-AHP implementation for each node is 
carried out according to HAZOP-AHP framework
16
. 
Once information has been analysed, compiled and 
updated for the selected equipment or streams, the end 
users can choose next equipment or stream within the 
selected node for HAZOP-AHP. After all the identified 
hazards within the selected node have been ranked, the 
end users can choose next node of the pilot plant. The 
process will continue until all nodes in the P&ID are 
completed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case Study 
To demonstrate the developed concept, a case study 
was conducted using the high pressure CO2-
hydrocarbon absorption pilot plant at Universiti 
Teknologi PETRONAS. The pilot plant is used to 
study the absorption performance of amine solvent in 
removing carbon dioxide (CO2) from the natural-gas 
stream for pressure of up to 80 bars. Since the pilot 
plant is handling a flammable gas at a high pressure 
condition, it is a compulsory requirement by the 
university that the test rig is subjected to process 
hazard assessment and management. The objective of 
this study is to identify the main cause or possible 
hazards that could contribute to fire event. Referring to 
the concept illustrated in above section, Figure 2 
shows the selected node for this case study, which 
consists of absorption column (AC01/AC02) with inlet 
and outlet streams. The corresponding HAZOP 
analysis for this node is shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 1: The fundamental scale of absolute number by 
(Saaty 1980)
18
. 
Intensity Importance 
 
Definition 
explanation 
1 Equal importance Two activities 
contribute equally to 
the objective 
2 Weak or slight  
3 Moderate 
importance 
Experience and 
judgment slightly favor 
one activity over 
another  
4 Moderate plus  
6 Strong plus  
7 Very strong or 
demonstrated 
importance 
An activity is favored 
very strongly over 
another, its dominance 
demonstrated in 
practice 
8 Very, very strong  
9 Extreme 
importance 
The evidence favoring 
one activity over 
another is of the 
highest possible order 
of affirmation 
 
Reciprocal 
of above 
If activity ihas one 
of the above non-
zero numbers 
assigned to it when 
compared with 
activity j, then j has 
the reciprocal value 
when compared 
with i. 
A  reasonable 
assumption 
1.1-1.9 If the activities are 
very close 
May be difficult to 
assign the best value 
but when compared 
with other contrasting 
activities the size of the 
small numbers would 
not be too noticeable, 
yet they can still 
indicate the relative 
importance of the 
activities  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Process flow of HAZOP-AHP data 
management using P&ID as a foundation. 
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Table 2: Selected HAZOP study of CHAS Pilot Plant. 
Node 4: Absorption Column AC 01/02 with inlet and outlet streams. 
Item Process Parameters 
Deviation 
(guideword) 
Possible Causes Possible Consequences Safeguards Recommendation 
4A Level More 1. Actuator PV 01/02 
failed and stuck closed. 
 
1. Back flow from inlet line of AC 01/02 
causes internal compressor COM 01/02 
damage resulting leak of used solvent and 
mixture gas. Any available ignition source 
could cause fire. 
1. High level indicator 
LS01/03  
2. Direct drain HV 31/32 
 
1. Regular functionality 
check of PV 01/02. 
 2. To install new check valve 
before ball valve HV33 and 
HV34 
 
  2. NV01/02 failed and 
stuck closed. 
1. Back flow from inlet line of AC 01/02 
causes internal compressor CM 01/02 
damage resulting leak of used solvent and 
mixture gas. Any available ignition source 
could cause fire. 
1. High level indicator 
LS01/03 via PLC 
2. Direct drain HV 31/32. 
1. Regular functionality 
check of NV01/02 
2.  To install new check valve 
before ball valve HV33 
and HV34 
4D Temperature More 
 
1. Initial reaction between 
solvent and CO2.  
1. Overheated AC 01/02 causes leak at 
sampling joint resulting release of mixture 
gas and hot solvent. Any available ignition 
source could cause fire. 
1. Column temperature 
monitoring via TT03-11 
2. Pressure drop monitoring 
via PT03-11 
 
4E Pressure More 1. HV 29/30 fail and stuck 
closed   
1. Overpressure in AC01/02 up to max 
COM01/02 pressure (150 bar) cause 
column rupture resulting release of mixture 
gas and hot solvent. Any available ignition 
source could cause fire.  
1. Pressure increment 
monitoring via PT03-11 
2. COM01/02 manual 
shutdown once P exceed 
80 bar 
1. Regular functionality 
check of HV29/30 
2. To install new pressure 
relief valve after BPV 
01/02 
See more level cause 1 at 
4A 
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Problem decomposition hierarchy  
Problem decomposition is very important in decision 
making. After the HAZOP analysis table is 
constructed, the next step is to decompose the problem 
into a hierarchical form. Figure 3 shows the 
hierarchical problem decomposition of the selected 
nodes. The analysis goal is to identify the main cause 
or possible hazards that could contribute to fire event. 
The goal is then expanded to the second level or 
criteria that represent the boundary analysis node 
which is in this case, the absorption column. The third 
level or sub-criteria is the related process parameter 
including level, temperature and pressure. For each 
process parameters, it will be further broken down to 
the fourth level which describes the deviation of the 
parameters which is ‘more’. The fifth level is the 
causes which indicate condition that give rise to the 
deviation parameters.Finally in the last level of the 
hierarchy are the alternative or possible consequences 
anticipated due to the deviation of the parameter which 
directly contribute to the significant operation and 
safety issues. 
 
Pairwise comparison 
A pairwise comparison is performed at every level. 
The comparison process can be aided using series of 
questions that relates the relationship of the compared 
elements and the control criterion. For example in this 
case, in the third level the question was raised ‘How 
much important is level compared to the temperature 
when performing HAZOP at the selected node (Node 
4)’. In this question, level acts as the base criterion 
while temperature is the paired criteria and the 
performing HAZOP at the absorption column AC01/02 
(Node 4) is the control criterion. Table 3 shows that 
pressure is identified as the most important parameter 
in contributing to hazards with relative weight of 
0.64833. It is followed by level and temperature which 
have relative weight of 0.22965 and 0.12202, 
respectively. These values indicate that ‘pressure’ is 
the most anticipated parameter to be considered in 
conjunction with HAZOP analysis for the AC 01/02 
followed by level and temperature. Based on the 
parameter deviation (fourth level), the results are 
tabulated in Table 4. It shows that MORE pressure 
(3.1) is anticipated to cause to the highest process 
deviation with the relative weight of 0.70097, followed 
by MORE level (1.1) and MORE temperature which 
have 0.19288 and 0.10615 of relative weight 
respectively. Based on three deviations of parameters, 
deviation of MORE pressure is crucial compared to the 
other deviation. All the consistency ratios are below 
than 10%, thus the pairwise judgments that have been 
made can be trusted.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Part of the CHAS P&ID showing selected 
node. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Priorities result based on parameters. 
 Parameter 
 
Priorities 
1.0 Level 0.22965 
2.0 Temperature 0.12202 
3.0 Pressure 0.64833 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Priorities result based on parameters 
deviations. 
 Parameter 
Deviation 
 
Priorities 
1.1 More 0.19288 
2.1 More 0.10615 
3.1 More 0.70097 
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Figure 3: Hierarchical problem decomposition for the absorption column (AC 01/02). 
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Table 5 shows the synthesized priorities for the 
consequences (alternatives) of absorption column 
AC01/02 based on cause of deviation. The Normals 
column presents the results in the form of the 
priorities. The Ideals column is obtained from Normals 
column by dividing each of the value with the largest 
value in the column. Thus, the best choice has a 
priority of 1. Based on the SDS synthesis, the 
consequence of AC 01/02 column rupture (3.1.1.1) has 
the highest priority of 0.4862. The lowest priority is 
referred to damage to compressor COM 01/02 (1.1.1.1 
and 1.1.2.1) with the Normals value of 0.1148. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 shows the enhanced version of HAZOP 
analysis table incorporating the AHP analysis for 
hazard prioritization. From this, it is shown that 
activity 3.1.1 (HV 29/30 fail and stuck closed) is the 
most significant causes of fire event in the absorption 
column AC 01/02, this is followed by 3.1.2 (Actuator 
PV 01/02 failed and stuck closed), 2.1.1 (initial 
reaction between solvent and CO2), 1.1.1 (Actuator 
PV 01/02 failed and stuck closed) and 1.1.2 (NV 01/02 
failed and stuck closed).HAZOP-AHP started 
according to the deductive approach (downward) 
postulating top events (deviations), and then followed 
the inductive method (upward) asking what would 
happen to the system. This definition revealed the 
reason for the success of HAZOP and underscored its 
widespread usage compared to other well-known 
analysis systems.By identifying the most significant 
causes, the engineers/researchers could take 
appropriate action associated with the prioritized cause 
for inherently safer process design. In addition, by 
having systematic PHA data management overlook of 
process hazards can be prevented.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, the application of AHP in prioritizing 
HAZOP analysis for pilot plant is presented. The 
method has been applied to high pressure CO2-
hydrocarbon absorption system pilot plants as case 
study. The results show that, HAZOP-AHP 
methodology is able to identify and rank the most 
significant hazards among the identified list of hazards. 
This is particularly useful as a leading indicator to 
process designers/engineers/researcher in prioritizing 
their efforts and resources on more significant hazards, 
hence prevent accidents of the pilot plant.Anyhow, in 
AHP,relative measurements about pairwise 
comparison ratios with respect to the strength of 
preference between elements of comparison are based 
on human intuition. Therefore, the decision makers 
need to express their opinion regarding the value of 
single pairwise comparison at a time and need to 
choose their answer based on the Saaty (1980) 
evaluation scale. 
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Table 5: The weight of the consequences from SDS. 
Alternative (Consequences) Ideals Normals 
1.1.1.1 Back flow from inlet line 
of AC 01/02 causes 
internal compressor 
COM 01/02 damage 
resulting leak of used 
solvent and mixture gas. 
Any available ignition 
source could cause fire. 
0.2361 0.1148 
1.1.2.1 Back flow from inlet line 
of AC 01/02 causes 
internal compressor COM 
01/02 damage resulting 
leak of used solvent and 
mixture gas. Any available 
ignition source could cause 
fire. 
0.2361 0.1148 
2.1.1.1 Overheated AC 01/02 
causes leak at sampling 
joint resulting release of 
mixture gas and hot 
solvent. Any available 
ignition source could cause 
fire. 
0.2509 0.1220 
3.1.1.1 Overpressure in AC01/02 
up to max COM01/02 
pressure (150 bar) cause 
column rupture resulting 
release of mixture gas and 
hot solvent. Any available 
ignition source could cause 
fire. 
1.0000 0.4862 
3.1.2.1 Back flow from inlet line 
of AC 01/02 causes 
internal compressor COM 
01/02 damage resulting 
leak of used solvent and 
mixture gas. Any available 
ignition source could cause 
fire. 
0.3333 0.1621 
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Table 6: Prioritizing HAZOP analysis using analytic hierarchy process (AHP). 
Goal 
 
Study node Parameter Deviation Causes Consequences Normal Rank Action 
Main 
cause that 
contribute  
to fire 
event 
Absorption 
column AC 
01/02 with 
inlet and 
outlet 
streams 
1.0 Level 1.1 More 1.1.1 Actuator PV 
01/02 failed and 
stuck closed. 
 
1.1.1.1Back flow from inlet line 
of AC 01/02 causes internal 
compressor COM 01/02 damage 
resulting leak of used solvent and 
mixture gas. Any available 
ignition source could cause fire. 
 
0.1148 4 1. Regular functionality 
check of PV 01/02. 
2. To install new check 
valve before ball 
valve HV33 and 
HV34 
  1.1.2 NV01/02 
failed and stuck 
closed. 
1.1.2.1Back flow from inlet line 
of AC 01/02 causes internal 
compressor COM 01/02 damage 
resulting leak of used solvent and 
mixture gas. Any available 
ignition source could cause fire. 
 
0.1148 5 1. Regular functionality 
check of NV01/02 
2. To install new check 
valve before ball 
valve HV33 and 
HV34 
2.0 Temperature 2.1 More 2.1.1 Initial 
reaction between 
solvent and CO2. 
2.1.1 1. Overheated AC 01/02 
causes leak at sampling joint 
resulting release of mixture gas 
and hot solvent. Any available 
ignition source could cause fire. 
 
0.1220 3  
3.0 Pressure 3.1 More 3.1.1 HV 29/30 
fail and stuck 
closed   
3.1.1.1 Overpressure in AC01/02 
up to max COM01/02 pressure 
(150 bar) cause column rupture 
resulting release of mixture gas 
and hot solvent. Any available 
ignition source could cause fire. 
 
0.4862 1 1. Regular functionality 
check of HV29/30 
2. To install new 
pressure relief valve 
after BPV 01/02 
  3.1.2 Actuator PV 
01/02 failed and 
stuck closed. 
3.1.2.1 Back flow from inlet line 
of AC 01/02 causes internal 
compressor COM 01/02 damage 
resulting leak of used solvent and 
mixture gas. Any available 
ignition source could cause fire 
0.1621 2 1. Regular functionality 
check of PV 01/02. 
2. To install new check 
valve before ball valve 
HV33 and HV34 
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